The Sporting Exception in EU Law

Angelo Giacomini Ribas
© 2011

Introduction – The rise of the relationship between European Union law and Sport

Until the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, sport was not mentioned in any of the EU Treaties, hence the European Union (EU) had no legislative competence to regulate the sports sector until December 2009. Nevertheless, the Treaty of Rome (TFEU) has broad provisions regulating the functioning of the whole economy, which established, inter alia, the principles of free movement of workers (Art 45 TFEU) and freedom to provide services (Art 56 TFEU), and also the strict rules of the EU competition law (Arts 101 and 102 TFEU, respectively prohibition of restrictive arrangements between “undertakings ” and prohibition of abuse of a dominant position). Despite not being explicitly within the competence of the EU, as sport has important economic aspects – it is in fact a multi-billionaire industry – it has not escaped the broad scope of the Treaty regarding economic activity. Therefore, where sport touches the economy, it has to comply with the EU law.(1) Nevertheless, there are also many aspects of sport that are not related to economic activity which have been recognised as out of the scope of EU regulation, sometimes even if they ultimately have some economic effects which are capable of objective justification. (2) The border between where sport is subject to EU law and where it is not is a grey area, and the governance of the sports sector have been struggling in the past few decades trying to avoid, as much as possible, the interference of the EU in the sporting field.

The rise of the “sporting exception” to EU law

Back in 1974, it was established by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the landmark case Walrave and Koch v Association Union Cycliste Internationale(3) that “[h]aving regard to the objectives of the Community, the practice of sport is subject to Community law only in so far as it constitutes an economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 of the Treaty [of Rome]. ”(4) This ground-breaking statement would be repeated by the Court many times over the years in many others not less significant judgements. The Walrave case regarded nationality clauses imposed by sports governing bodies (SGBs) which prohibited teams composed by members of different nationalities to compete in an international championship. Although in that case the ECJ ruled that the Treaty provisions prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of nationality apply to sport “[w]hen such activity has the character of gainful employment or remunerated service”(5), nevertheless the Court held that “this prohibition however does not affect the composition of sports teams, in particular national teams, the formation of which is a question of purely sporting interest and as such has nothing to do with economic activity.” (6) This latter statement, which coined the phrase “purely sporting interests”, became the argument on which SGBs most relied in subsequent cases in which sport was again scrutinised under the light of the EU law. It also originated what is known today as “the sporting exception” (or also as sporting exemption), which corresponds to the holy grail of the sports governance.(7)

Since then, the sports governance in Europe have sought the recognition of such “sporting exception” to the EU legislation. From the perspective of these bodies, the rules by which the sporting governance is organised should not be subject to EU law as they are concerned only with “purely sporting interests”. It follows that SGBs praised the “purely sporting interest” concept and the pursued “sporting exception” without realise that actually the crucial point in the Walrave ruling was that sport as economic activity is subject to EU law. Therefore, the “exception” and the “non-exception” actually have emerged together, although it seems that sports regulators preferred to closed their eyes to the last.(8)

This argument was submitted to test in 1976, in Donà v Mantero(9), when the ECJ had to appreciate another sports case related to nationality restriction. This time, however, the issue was regarding the tough restrictions that the Italian Football Federation (FIGC, as abbreviated in Italian) was imposing to foreign professional footballers wishing to play in the Italian league. In this case, Advocate General Trabucchi provided a remarkable statement in his opinion submitted to the Court affirming that in his view there was “nothing to prevent considerations of purely sporting interest from justifying the imposition of some restriction on the signing of foreign players or at least their participation in official championship matches…”(10). His reasoning was based in a supposed necessity for national federations to ensure that the winning team in the national championship would be able to represent the country in international competitions. Although this argument at a first sight seems one very difficult to accept, nevertheless, the Court has followed it, albeit in a more restrictive way, as it stated in its judgment that “[r]ules or a national practice, even adopted by a sporting organisation, which limit the right to take part in football matches as professional or semi-professional players solely to the nationals of the State in question, are incompatible with … the Treaty unless such rules … are not of an economic nature … and are thus of sporting interest only.”(11)

Nevertheless, it was also relevant in the Donà case that the ECJ has also established that the Treaty provisions regarding the prohibition of the discrimination of workers and service providers on the grounds of nationality “have direct effect in the legal orders of the member States and confer on individuals which national Courts must protect.”(12)  Therefore, in spite of placing much greater weight in the in the concept of “purely sporting interests”, hence nurturing the concept of “sporting exception”, rather than in considering the economic consequences of the respective restriction and its broader impact, the ECJ ruling in Donà also contributed to clarify that the free movement principles are directly and horizontally applicable, whilst the effects of such clarification would hit hardly the sports governance in Europe nearly two decades latter.

A closer examination of both the Walrave and Donà cases considered as a whole reveals that the Court recognised that in the sports sector there are rules which are of a non-economic “purely sporting interest”, which are automatically excluded from the scope of the Treaty.(13)  Assessing whether or not such rules which fall in that definition will be the first step in the analytical process of the Court in determining whether or not they are subject to EU law. Only if a given rule or practice do not fit this category the Court will assess the extent to which such practice is economic in nature and whether they constitute an economic activity within the meaning of the Treaty that it will not be excluded from the European internal market and competition rules. (14) Therefore, I can be extracted from Walrave and Donà cases that  the ECJ recognised that sport has a particular nature which renders it “special”. Nevertheless, whereas in Walrave the establishes was very narrow in its scope, specifically regarding nationality clauses in team sports representing a country in an international competition, the scope of the exception in Donà was much broader, implying that interferences of sport in the Treaty provisions could be easily justified.(15) Finally, another important fact to be noted is that the court established that the Treaty provisions on free movement and prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality are horizontally directly effective.

The Commission’s approach to nationality discrimination in sports during the years between Donà and Bosman

In spite of a growing number of disputes relating to discriminatory practices in Sport, the European Commission did not fully enforce the Walrave and Donà rulings whilst its negotiations with UEFA in that regard were failing.(16) In 1978, UEFA was persuaded by the Commission to modify its rules in order to abolish discrimination on the grounds of nationality, however the change made was minimal, permitting football clubs to limit the number of non-nationals in two per match, in spite of objection from both the Commission and the European Parliament.(17) In the period between 1984 and 1991, whilst negotiations regarding the completion of the EU single market were ongoing,  the negotiation between the Commission and UEFA regarding nationality restriction rules in football were also intense, and culminated in the adoption of the 3+2 rule by which football clubs were allowed to field up to three non-national players plus two others non-nationals which gained a “national status” by playing in the respective country for at least five years.(18)

During that period the approach of the Commission towards this question was ambiguous. On the one hand, the Commission fiercely criticised the discriminatory practices adopted in sport, insisting in their abolition in order to make sport compliant with the Treaty provisions in that area. On the other hand, it could have been effective using its power to enforce those rules using its powers of direct sanction of competition law, but preferred to take a soft approach opting for negotiation instead.(19) Therefore, during that period UEFA’s wishes prevailed and discrimination on the grounds of nationality continued, in spite of the slight amendments adopted.

The Bosman case: A new dawn has broken, has it not?

In the URBSFA v Bosman(20), the question submitted for the appreciation of the ECJ concerned whether or not the nationality restrictions and transfer rules imposed by the football governing bodies contravened the free movement provisions of the Treaty of Rome. The main challenge in Bosman regarded the 3+2 rule, which object was essentially nationality discrimination, and the transfer fees to which football clubs were entitled to receive when its players moved to a different club, even after the end of their contracts.(21) Although the transfer fee regime is not discriminatory in nature, is was essentially restrictive, affecting negatively the free movement of professional football players within the EU.

In Bosman, the ECJ revisited in detail the Walrave and Donà cases, which had been decided by the Court roughly twenty years latter. One important factor that should be noted is that during those nearly twenty years period between Donà and Bosman cases, sport in general, especially football, have developed its commercial potential in an impressive rate, in a way that its economic relevancy in the late seventies was just a fraction that it was in the middle nineties when Bosman was decided by the ECJ.(22)  Therefore, it is not surprising that the ECJ has analysed much more thoroughly the commercial aspects of sport and the broader consequences of the restrictions imposed by sports authorities to the freedoms of players in Bosman than it did in Walrave and Donà cases.

It was inferred by the ECJ in Bosman that its rulings in Walrave and Donà cases did not created a “sporting exception” which excluded sport as a whole from the scope EU law. In Bosman, the ECJ affirmed that it was ruled in the Donà case, considering the difficulty of distinguishing the economic and the sporting aspects of football, that the provisions of EU law regarding the free movement principles do not preclude rules or practices justified on non-economic grounds which are related to the particular nature and context of certain matches, and that such restrictions on the scope of that provisions shall stay limited to its proper objective. Finally the Court affirmed that the decision its previous ruling could not be relied upon to exempt the whole of the sporting activity from the scope of the Treaty.(23)

The Bosman case represented a move in the analytical process of the Court from focusing primarily on the question of whether or not a given practice or rule concerned a “purely sporting interest” to concentrate on the question of whether or not it constituted an economic activity. In making this movement, although the Court did not reject its previous decisions, it limited their scope by refining the definition of their context.(24)  Indeed, it seems that in the Bosman ruling the ECJ intended to amend the effects of its decision in Donà in the sense that practices of sporting interest are not excluded for the reason that they lack economic characteristics by definition, but they are excluded because they are of sporting interest and may be excluded even if they contain an economic interest but do not go beyond the sporting purpose for which they were intended.(25)  Therefore, one might argue that the broader “sporting exception” derivative from the concept of rules or practices of “purely sporting interest” which was capable of excluding the sporting activity from the scope of the treaty as a whole was then effectively extinct.(26)

Instead of applying that broad concept of “sporting exception”, the ECJ in Bosman promoted a “relatively coherent system of objective justification”(27) under which the UEFA’s 3+2 nationality rules and transfer system were then scrutinised. In relation to the former, the ECJ held that they were not simply an example of discrimination, but rather an obstacle to the Treaty’s free movement provisions, to the extend that they restricted access to the labour market.(28) In relation to the last, the court recognised that such system was not discriminatory in nature, as it did not made it more difficult for players to move to clubs in different Member States that it did domestically. Nevertheless, the Court made it plain that Article 45 TFEU is does not only applies to discrimination on grounds of nationality, but rather extends to all restrictions that negatively affect the free movement principles.(29)  Having established that both the challenged rules represented restrictions to the free movement provisions, the Court then moved on to decide whether such restriction could be justified in terms of their objectives and proportionality in order to determine whether or not a objectively justified “sporting exemption” could be granted.

Although the ECJ recognised that sport has particular characteristics which differentiate it in relation to other traditional industries, the arguments which were submitted to the Court purporting to justify the rules challenged fell short of the capacity to accomplish their task, as the effect of that measures were found as not proportionate to their objectives.(30) The ECJ concluded that “none of the justificatory grounds put forward were both suitable for achieving those aims and the least restrictive measures possible and that nationality rules were therefore disproportionate.”(31)  Therefore, the ECJ’s ruling in Bosman outlawed the UEFA’s 3+2 rule of nationality restriction and also its transfer system in the way that it was then organised. However, the effects of this ruling go beyond that. Firstly, it narrowed the reach of the Donà ruling, departing from the concept of rules and practices of “purely sporting interest” capable of placing sporting activity automatically outside the scope of EU law, and adopted a more coherent approach of objective justification on the basis of proportionality between the aims pursued and measures taken in order to achieve such aims, which must be effective and shall not go beyond the necessary to achieving their objectives. Nevertheless, it left it open for legitimate restrictions which are properly justified to be exempt from EU law provided that it passes the test.  In addition, the ECJ not only confirmed its previous finding that Article 45 TFEU is directly horizontally applicable, but also provided that that provision is not restricted to prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of nationality but also extends to non-discriminatory practices that negatively affect the free movement of workers. Also, the Bosman ruling changed the focus of EU sports policy promoting the concern with the need to protect the specificity of sport from the indiscriminate and application of EU law. And finally, the Bosman ruling abolished the entitlement to transfers fees at the end of a player’s employment contract.

The special characteristics of sport and the new approach of the EU institutions towards sport

It was also recognised in Bosman that although sport is in fact an economic activity, it differs substantially from others. For that reason, it is argued that sport is “special”, and therefore deserves a “special treatment” in relation to the application of the law. Among the characteristics which makes sport special, are, inter alia, the mutual interdependence between competitors and the need for a centralised regulatory control which will normally also be responsible for organising and running regular competitions and also for making sure that rules are respected by all individuals and entities involved. Also, differently than what happen in other economic sectors, it is necessary to maintain a competitive between participants, ensuring that at least a minimum number of them remain in the market with similar strength, as the unpredictability of the outcome is a key characteristics of sport. Sport clubs and governing bodies have also an important role nurturing the future generations of athletes, being responsible for their recruiting and training.

With this view in mind, in 1997 The Amsterdam Declaration on Sport was incorporated to the Amsterdam Treaty, acknowledging the social significant of sport for the EU “in particular its role in forging identity and bringing people together”. In that document, the Conference also called the bodies of the EU to listen to sports associations when deciding on important questions which could affect sport, and also asked for special consideration to the “particular characteristics of amateur sport.”(32) Following this, in 1999 the Commission submitted the Helsinki Report, “with a view to safeguarding the current sports structures and maintaining the social function of sport within the European Union.”(33) Latter, as another evidence of change of the  EU approach towards sport spawned by the Bosman ruling, in 2000, the Commission emitted The Nice Declaration on Sport which covered a number of topics ranging from the importance of sport as a fundamental value to the role of sports federations, preservation of training policies, protection of young athletes, the solidarity of sport in the economic context and sports’ transfer system.  This document was welcomed for most SGBs(34), which had their hopes renewed in pursuing a genuine legally binding “sporting exception” in a nearby future.

The cases of Deliège and Lehtonen and the rules which are “inherent” to sport

The cases of Deliège v Ligue Francophone de Judo et Disciplines Associees ASBL(35) and Lehtonen v Federation Royale Belge des Societes de basketball ASBL (FRBSB)(36) were the first cases to bring back the free movement principles and EU competition law regarding the sporting field to before the ECJ since the “Bosman earthquake”. In both cases the ECJ was required by the respective referring national courts to provide clarification as to the application of the EU competition law to the sporting rules in question. Nevertheless, eventually the ECJ declined to answer on those questions, on the basis that the information provided regarding the factual and legal elements of the dispute was insufficient to identify the relevant markets, the undertakings concerned, or the existence and extent of trade between Member States for the purposes of competition law.(37) Nevertheless, the Court addressed the issues related to the free movement of persons, in the Lehtonen case, and free provision of services in the case of Deliège.(38) In both cases, the ECJ restated it previous case law that the free movement principles do not preclude the adoption of rules or practices restricting the right of foreign players to participate in certain matches for reasons of “non economic nature” and “sporting interest only”.(39)

The Deliège case regarded a challenge brought by an elite level judoka against  the rules of the respective SGBs concerning the her eligibility to participate in international and European competitions, and a fortiori in the Olympic games, which was dependent on being selected by her national federation.  After been refused a place in the national team for a significant tournament she brought legal proceedings to challenge the selection criteria. The national court sought the guidance of the European Court as to the application of the Treaty provisions on freedom to provide services and competition law to this issue.

In Deliège, the ECJ held that “The mere fact that a sports association or federation unilaterally classified its members as amateur athletes did not in itself mean that those members did not engage in economic activities within the meaning of Article 2 [TFEU]”(40) With regard to the Treaty provisions on freedom to provide services the Court held that they are not applicable to activities that are confined in all respects within a single Member State, but that a “degree of extraneity might derive in particular from the fact that an athlete participated in a competition in a Member State other than that in which he was established.”(41) Also it was held by the court that the concepts of “economic activity” and “provision of services” within the meaning of  the fundamental freedoms provided by the Treaty shall not be interpreted restrictively(42) and that in sport, in particular “a high-ranking athlete’s participation in an international competition are capable of involving the provision of a number of separate, but closely related, services which may fall within the scope of Article [56] of the Treaty even if some of those services are not paid for by those for whom they are performed”(43)

However, in assessing whether the selection rules at issue constituted a restriction on the freedom to provide services within the meaning of the Treaty, the Court held that “[a]lthough a selection system may prove more favourable to one category of athletes than another, it cannot be inferred from that fact alone that the adoption of that system constitutes a restriction on  the freedom to provide services …  as long as it derives from a need inherent in the organisation of such a competition, constitute a restriction on the freedom to provide services prohibited by Article [56] of the Treaty”(44)

In Lehtonen, the challenged rule regarded the transfer window‘s deadline of the International BasketBall Federation (FIBA). Lehtonen, a basketball player of Finish nationality, had played the Finnish basketball championship in the season in 1995-1996, and that competition had finished he engaged with a Belgian basketball team in order to play the remaining games of the Belgian season. However his club was punished twice for fielding him, as it missed the transfer window’s deadline for players from the “European zone” whereas is was still possible for players from other zones to be make such transfer. For that reason proceedings were brought against the Belgian Basketball Federation.(45)

In its judgment, the Court recognised that the transfer window’s deadline was de facto an obstacle to the freedom of movement of workers as it prevented Belgian clubs from fielding players from other member states. The Court also stated that the fact that the rules in question did not concern the employment of players, on which there was no restriction,  nevertheless, as participation in basketball matches is the essential purpose of a professional player’s activity, a rule restricting such participation also restricted the chances of employment of the player concerned. However, the ECJ acknowledged that the setting of deadlines for transfers could achieve the objective of “ensuring the regularity of sporting competitions”, and that late transfers could  substantially alter the sporting strength of one or other team in the course of the championship, thus  calling into question the “proper functioning” of sporting competition. Nevertheless, it also stated that any measures taken to ensure the proper functioning of competition “may not go beyond what is necessary for achieving the aim pursued”. Finally, the Court held that it was for the national court to determine the extent to which objective reasons, concerning only sporting aspects, could justify this differential treatment of players from inside and outside the European zone. (46)

The ECJ rulings in Deliège and Lehtonen cases established that rules that are considered “inherent” to the organisation of sport  are not considered restrictions to the free movement  principles guaranteed by the Treaty, insofar as those rules effectively accomplish their sporting objectives without going beyond what is necessary to achieve them. In addition, it is important to note that in both judgments the Court respected the regulatory competence of sports federations’ in determining what measures are necessary to deal with  with the issues regarding the organisation of their respective sports.

Meca-Medina

The case Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission of the European Communities(47) came before the ECJ as an appeal against the decision of the Court of First Instance of the EU (CFI), which in turn was an appeal againd a decision of the Commission dismissing the clam of the appellants who challenged the anti-doping regulations of the International Swimming Federation and the Olympic Committee.

In Meca-Medina, the ECJ set aside a judgment of the CFI which had applied the outdated concept of “sporting exception” which was the derivative of the concept of “purely sporting interest”, which was abandoned by the ECJ since Bosman in favour of the “sporting objective justification”. In justifying its reasons for its decision with this regard, the ECJ restated its ruling in Bosman, and also applied in Deliège affirming that “the mere fact that a rule is purely sporting in nature does not have the effect of removing from the scope of the Treaty the person engaging in  the activity governed by that rule or the body which has laid it down.”(48) In Meca-Medina the ECJ also restated all the relevant case-law established in its previous rulings regarding the sporting activities within the scope of and subject to EU law, reafirming that EU law does not preclude restrictions to its provision insofar that they are justified in non-economic grounds which measures are proportionate and does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve its sporting objectives, etc.(49)

With regard to the anti-doping regulations under the light of EU competition law, the ECJ stated that firstly, the compatibility of a particular case with EU competition law should be assessed in the overall context, taking into account the context in which the challenged decision is made, its effects and most importantly its objectives. Then in a second step of the analytical process, it must be considered whether the restrictive effects are “inherent” in the pursuit of the objectives and proportionate to them. In applying such test to the anti-doping regulations, the Court stated that even if those regulations placed a restriction to the appellants’ freedom of action,  it did not necessarily constituted a restriction of competition under EU law, as they were justified by legitimate objectives and “inherent to the organisation and proper conduct of competitive sport”. The Court also found the anti-doping sanctions to be necessary proportionate to its objectives.(50)

The Commission’s White Paper on Sport

The White Paper on Sport, is comprehensive strategic initiative of the EU Commission in the field of sport. It followed the process initiated by the Amsterdam Declaration, the Nice Declaration and the intergovernmental negotiations to include a provision regarding sport in the EU constitutional framework.(51) The White Paper is focused in three main areas: the role of sports in society, the economic dimension of sport and the organisational structure of the European model of sport. In the White Paper, the Commission tried to please a wide audience, providing a carefully balanced approach seeking to address the expectations of stakeholders with different views toward the same issues.(52) This included in special the governance of professional sports, which had great expectations substantial improvements of their position within EU in terms of assurance of their independence and the implementation of a proper “sporting exception” from the application of EU law. Although the White Paper defends the principle of subsidiarity, the autonomy of sport organisations and the current legislative framework it failed in satisfying the sports governance in Europe which manifested disappointment.(53)

Bernard case: A departure from Bosman.

According to the ECJ ruling in Olympique Lyonnais v Olivier Bernard and Newcastle, Article 45 TFEU does not preclude a scheme which, in order to attain the objective of encouraging the recruitment and training of young players, guarantees compensation to the club which provided the training if, at the end of his training period, a young player signs a  professional contract with a club in another Member State, provided that the scheme is  suitable to ensure the attainment of that objective and does not go beyond what is necessary to attain it. A scheme such as the one at issue in the main proceedings, under which a trainee player who signs a professional contract with a club in another Member State at the end of his training period is liable to pay damages calculated in a way which is unrelated to the actual costs of the training, is not necessary to ensure the attainment of that objective.

This decision was important as it held that it is legitimate for clubs to claim compensation for their investments on training amateur athletes when a player, at the end of his training contract, signs a professional contract with another club. It is important to note that, according to the ECJ such compensation must be calculated as an average of the costs of training  both future professional players and those who will never play professionally . This decision represents a significant departure from Bosman might also produce effects for trainees of other professional fields, including law.

Conclusion : the Treaty of Lisbon  – EU competence on sport

Article 165 of the Treaty provides EU competence towards sport. However it is very limited in scope. It is mostly directed to social and educational aspects and explicitly excludes harmonisation of law between and regulation of Member states. Nevertheless, it provides that the Union shall promote sport while taking account of its specific nature and structures. Therefore, is not the “sporting exception” dreamed by SGBs, and the case law of the exceptions provided by the ECJ case law still the only available.

REFERENCES:

1.Weatherhill, S. ‘European Sports Law: Collected Papers ‘, ISLJ [2007] (1-2) p. 33.
2.Parrish and Miettinen. The Sporting Exception in European Union Law. (2008) The Hague: T.M.C Asser Press, p. 234.
3.Case 36/74 [1974] E.C.R. 1405
4.Ibid at paragraph 4 of the Judgement.
5.Ibid at paragraphs 5-7.
6.Ibid at paragraph 8.
7.Parrish and Miettinen. op. cit. , pp.1-2.
8.Papaloukas, M. ‘The Sporting Exemption Principle in the European Court of Justice’s Case Law’, ISLJ [2009] (3-4), p.7.
9.[1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 578 .
10.Ibid, p. 582.
11.Ibid, p. 587, at paragraph 13.
12.Ibid, p. 587, at paragraph 14.
13.Papaloukas, M., op. cit. p. 8.
14.Ibid.
15.Parrish and Miettinen. op. cit. , pp. 76-86.
16.Parrish, R. Sports law and policy in the European Union, (2003) Manchester: Manchester University Press. p. 91.
17.Ibid.
18.Ibid, pp. 91-92.
19.Ibid, p. 92.
20.Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Association (Asbl) and Others v Jean-Marc Bosman [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 645
21.Parrish and Miettinen. op. cit. , p. 86.
22.Parrish, R., op. cit.p. 92.
23.[1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 645, p. 767, at paragraph 76.
24.Papaloukas, M., op. cit. p. 9.
25.Ibid.
26.Parrish and Miettinen. op. cit. , p. 88.
27.Ibid.
28.Parrish, R., op. cit.p. 99.
29.Ibid.
30.Ibid.
31.Parrish and Miettinen. op. cit. , p. 88.
32.Declaration n°29 attached to the Amsterdam treaty.
33.Gardiner et al. Sports Law (2007) 3rd ed., Cavendish: London, p. 166.
34.See FIFA’s statement on Nice Declaration <http://w dww.fifa.com/aboutfifa/federation/bodies/media/newsid=75618.html> and Common statement of team sport federations in Europe on the EU Commission’s White Paper on Sport Project of 20 September 2006. <http://www.uefa.com/uefa/mediaservices/mediareleases/newsid=943470.html>
35.Case C-51/96, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 65
36.Case C-176/96 [2000] E.C.R. I-2681 (ECJ (6th Chamber))
37.Case C-51/96, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 65 at paragraph 37.
38.Turner-Kerr and Bell. ‘The place of sport within the rules of Community law: clarification from the ECJ? The Deliege and Lehtonen cases’ [2002] E.C.L.R. 256, at 257.
39.Ibid.
40.Case C-51/96, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 65 at paragraph 46.
41.Case C-51/96, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 65 at paragraph 58.
42.Ibid, at paragraph 52.
43.Ibid, at paragraph 56.
44.Ibid, at paragraphs 66 and 69.
45.Turner-Kerr and Bell, op. cit. p. 259.
46.Ibid.
47.Case C-519/04 P [2006] 5 C.M.L.R. 18 (ECJ) (Third Chamber)
48.Ibid, at paragraph 27.
49.Ibid, at paragraphs 25-31.
50.Ibid, at paragraphs 46-47.
51.Krejza, M. ‘The European Commission’s White Paper on Sport’ ISLJ [2007] (3-4) p. 73
52.Ibid.
53.Statement of the European team sports on the Commission’s White Paper